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WHO GAVE YOU THE CAUCHY–WEIERSTRASS
TALE? THE DUAL HISTORY OF RIGOROUS
CALCULUS
ALEXANDRE BOROVIK AND MIKHAIL G. KATZ0
Abstract. Cauchy’s contribution to the foundations of analysis is
often viewed through the lens of developments that occurred some
decades later, namely the formalisation of analysis on the basis of
the epsilon-delta doctrine in the context of an Archimedean con-
tinuum. What does one see if one refrains from viewing Cauchy
as if he had read Weierstrass already? One sees, with Felix Klein,
a parallel thread for the development of analysis, in the context of
an infinitesimal-enriched continuum. One sees, with Emile Borel,
the seeds of the theory of rates of growth of functions as devel-
oped by Paul du Bois-Reymond. One sees, with E. G. Bjo¨rling,
an infinitesimal definition of the criterion of uniform convergence.
Cauchy’s foundational stance is hereby reconsidered.
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1. Introduction
When the second-named author first came across a recent book by
Anderson et al entitledWho Gave You the Epsilon? And Other Tales of
Mathematical History [2], he momentarily entertained a faint glimmer
of hope. The book draws its title from an older essay, entitled Who
Gave You the Epsilon? Cauchy and the origins of rigorous calculus [61].
The faint hope was that the book would approach the thesis implied by
the title of the older essay, in a critical spirit, namely, as an ahistorical1
tale in need of re-examination. Anderson et al not having undertaken
the latter task, such an attempt is made here.
Cauchy based his definitions of both limits and infinitesimals on the
concept of a variable quantity.2 The variable quantities used in his
Cours d’Analyse in 1821 are generally understood by scholars as being
(discrete) sequences of values. Cauchy wrote that a variable quantity
tending to zero becomes infinitely small. How do his null sequences
become infinitesimals? In 1829, Cauchy developed a detailed theory
of infinitesimals of arbitrary order (not necessarily integer), based on
rates of growth of functions. How does his theory connect with the work
1See Grattan-Guinness’s comment on ahistory in the main text around foot-
note 65.
2C. Gilain’s claims to the effect that “Cauchy de´finissait le concept d’infiniment
petit a` l’aide du concept de limite, qui avait le premier roˆle” [54, footnote 67] are
both in error; see Subsection 3.1 below. Already in 1973, Hourya Benis Sinaceur
wrote: “on dit trop rapidement que c’est Cauchy qui a introduit la ‘me´thode
des limites’ entendant par la`, plus ou moins vaguement, l’emploi syste´matique de
l’e´psilonisation” [123, p. 108], and pointed out that Cauchy’s definition of limit re-
sembles, not that of Weierstrass, but rather that of Lacroix dating from 1810 [123,
p. 109].
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of later authors? In 1902, E. Borel elaborated on du Bois-Reymond’s
theory of rates of growth, and outlined a general “theory of increase”
of functions, as a way of implementing an infinitesimal-enriched con-
tinuum. Borel traced the lineage of such ideas to Cauchy’s text. We
examine several views of Cauchy’s foundational contribution in analy-
sis.
Cauchy’s foundational stance has been the subject of an ongoing
controversy. The continuing relevance of Cauchy’s foundational stance
stems from the fact that Cauchy developed some surprisingly modern
mathematics using infinitesimals. The following four items deserve to
be mentioned:
(1) Cauchy’s proof of the binomial formula (series) for arbitrary ex-
ponents . The proof exploits infinitesimals. D. Laugwitz [90, p. 266]
argues that this is the first correct proof of the formula.3
(2) Cauchy’s use of the Dirac delta function. Over a century before
Dirac, Cauchy exploited “delta functions” to solve problems in Fourier
analysis and in the evaluation of singular integrals. Such functions were
defined in terms of an infinitesimal parameter, see Freudenthal [51],
Laugwitz [91, p. 219], [92].
(3) Cauchy’s definition of continuity . Cauchy defined continuity of a
function y = f(x) as follows: an infinitesimal change α of the indepen-
dent variable x always produces an infinitesimal change f(x+ α)− f(x)
of the dependent variable y [24, p. 34]. Nearly half a century later,
Weierstrass reconstructed Cauchy’s infinitesimal definition in the fol-
lowing terms: for every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that for every
real α, if |α| < δ then |f(x + α) − f(x)| < ǫ. Many historians have
sought to interpret Cauchy’s definition as a proto-Weierstrassian defi-
nition of continuity in terms of limits.4
(4) Cauchy’s “sum theorem”. This result asserts the convergence to
a continuous function, of a series of continuous functions under a suit-
able condition of convergence. The sum theorem has been the subject
of a historical controversy, ever since A. Robinson [112, p. 271-273] pro-
posed a novel reading of the sum theorem that would make it correct.
3except for Bolzano’s proof in 1816, see [93, p. 657].
4Thus, Smithies [125, p. 53, footnote 20] cites the page in Cauchy’s book where
Cauchy gave the infinitesimal definition, but goes on to claim that the concept
of limit was Cauchy’s “essential basis” for his concept of continuity [125, p. 58].
Smithies looked in Cauchy, saw the infinitesimal definition, and went on to write
in his paper that he saw limits (see Subsection 3.1 for an analysis of a similar
misconception in Gilain). Such automated translation has been common at least
since Boyer [19, p. 277].
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The controversy hinges on the question whether the convergence con-
dition was meant by Cauchy to hold at the points of an Archimedean
continuum, or at the points of a Bernoullian continuum, namely, an
infinitesimal-enriched continuum (see Subsection 2.4). Lakatos pre-
sented a paper5 in 1966 where he argues that the 1821 result is cor-
rect as stated.6 Laugwitz concurs, see e.g. his 1989 text [91]. Post-
Weierstrassian historians tend both (a) to reject Cauchy’s infinitesi-
mals, claiming they are merely shorthand for limits, and (b) to claim
that his 1821 sum theorem was false. The 1821 formulation of the sum
theorem may in the end be too ambiguous to know what Cauchy’s
intention was at the time, if Cauchy himself knew.7
The four examples given above hopefully illustrate the interest in
understanding the nature of Cauchy’s foundational contribution.
In Section 2, we provide a re-appraisal of Cauchy’s foundational
stance, including Cauchy’s theory of orders of infinitesimals based on
orders of growth of functions (Subsection 2.1); how Cauchy null se-
quences become infinitesimals (Subsection 2.2); a detailed textual study
of the related portions of the Cours d’Analyse (Subsection 2.3); an
analysis of Cauchy’s key term toujours , strengthening the hypothesis
of his sum theorem (Subsection 2.4); an examination of some common
misconceptions in the Cauchy literature (Subsection 2.5).
In Section 3, we analyze the views of some modern authors. In Sec-
tion 4, we provide a timeline of the development of theories of infinitesi-
mals based on orders of growth of functions, from Cauchy through Paul
du Bois-Reymond to modern times. Some conclusions and outlook for
the future may be found in Section 5. Appendix A outlines the rel-
evant mathematical material on the rival continua, Archimedean and
Bernoullian.
2. A reappraisal of Cauchy’s foundational stance
2.1. Cauchy’s theory of orders of infinitesimals. Cauchy’s 1821
Cours d’Analyse [24] presented only a theory of infinitesimals of poly-
nomial rate of growth as compared to a given “base” infinitesimal α.
The shortcoming of such a theory is its limited flexibility. Since
Cauchy only considers infinitesimals behaving as polynomials of a fixed
infinitesimal, called the “base” infinitesimal in 1823 [25], his framework
5The paper was published posthumously in 1978 and edited by J. Cleave [89].
6Lakatos thereby reversed his position as presented in his Proofs and Refuta-
tions [88].
7See more details in Subsection 2.4.
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imposes obvious limitations on what can be done with such infinites-
imals. Thus, one typically can’t extract the square root of such a
“polynomial” infinitesimal.
What is remarkable is that Cauchy did develop a theory to overcome
this shortcoming. Cauchy’s theory of infinitesimals of arbitrary order
(not necessarily integer) is noted by A. Borel [16, p. 35-36] (see below).
In 1823, and in more detail in 1829, Cauchy develops a more flexible
theory, where an infinitesimal is represented by an arbitrary function
(rather than merely a polynomial) of a base infinitesimal, denoted “i”,
see Chapter 6 in [27]. The title of the chapter is significant. Indeed,
the title refers to functions as representing the infinitesimals; more
precisely, “fonctions qui repre´sentent des quantite´s infiniment petites”.
Here is what Cauchy has to say in 1829:
Designons par a un nombre constant, rationnel ou irra-
tionnel; par i une quantite´ infiniment petite, et par r un
nombre variable. Dans le systeme de quantite´s infini-
ment petites dont i sera la base, une fonction de i rep-
resente´e par f(i) sera un infiniment petit de l’ordre a,
si la limite du rapport f(i)/ir est nulle pour toutes les
valeurs de r plus petites que a, et infinie pour toutes les
valeurs de r plus grandes que a [27, p. 281].
Laugwitz [90, p. 271] explains this to mean that the order a of the
infinitesimal f(i) is the uniquely determined real number (possibly +∞,
as with the function e−1/t
2
) such that f(i)/ir is infinitesimal for r < a
and infinitely large for r > a.
Laugwitz [90, p. 272] notes that Cauchy provides an example of func-
tions defined on positive reals that represent infinitesimals of orders ∞
and 0, namely
e−1/i and
1
log i
(see Cauchy [27, p. 326-327]).
The development of non-Archimedean systems based on orders of
growth was pursued in earnest at the end of the 19th century by such
authors as Stolz, du Bois-Reymond, Levi-Civita, and Borel.8 Such
systems have an antecedent in Cauchy’s theory of infinitesimals as
developed in his texts dating from 1823 and 1829. Thus, in 1902,
E. Borel [16, p. 35-36] elaborated on du Bois-Reymond’s theory of
rates of growth, and outlined a general “theory of increase” of func-
tions, as a way of implementing an infinitesimal-enriched continuum.
Borel traced the lineage of such ideas to an 1829 text of Cauchy’s on
8See P. Ehrlich’s [39] for a more detailed discussion, as well as Section 4 below.
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the rates of growth of functions, see Fisher [47, p. 144] for details. In
1966, A. Robinson pointed out that
Following Cauchy’s idea that an infinitely small or in-
finitely large quantity is associated with the behavior
of a function f(x), as x tends to a finite value or to
infinity, du Bois-Reymond produced an elaborate the-
ory of orders of magnitude for the asymptotic behavior
of functions . . . Stolz tried to develop also a theory of
arithmetical operations for such entities [112, p. 277-
278].
Robinson traces the chain of influences further, in the following terms:
It seems likely that Skolem’s idea to represent infinitely
large natural numbers by number-theoretic functions
which tend to infinity (Skolem [1934]),9 also is related to
the earlier ideas of Cauchy and du Bois-Reymond [112,
p. 278].
Cauchy’s approach is by no means a variant of Robinson’s approach.10
Similarly, the notion of Cauchy as a pre-Weierstrassian who allegedly
“tried to dislodge infinitesimals from analysis” is just as dubious. Taken
to its logical conclusion, the dogma of Cauchy as a pre-Weierstrassian
can assume comical proportions. Thus, the fashionable Stephen Hawk-
ing comments that Cauchy
was particularly concerned to banish infinitesimals [68,
p. 639],
yet on the very same page 639, Hawking quotes Cauchy’s infinitesimal
definition of continuity in the following terms:
the function f(x) remains continuous with respect to x
between the given bounds, if, between these bounds, an
infinitely small increment in the variable always pro-
duces an infinitely small increment in the function itself
[68, p. 639].
Did Cauchy “banish” infinitesimals? Using infinitely small increments
is an odd way of doing so. Similarly, historian J. Gray lists continuity
among concepts Cauchy allegedly defined
9The reference is to Skolem’s 1934 work [124]. The evolution of modern infinites-
imals is traced further in the main text in Section 4 following footnote 71.
10More specifically, Cauchy was not in the possession of the mathematical tools
required to either formulate or justify the ultrapower construction, requiring as
it does a set-theoretic framework (dating from the end of the 19th century) to-
gether with the existence of ultrafilters (not proved until 1930 by Tarski [131]), see
Appendix A.
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using careful, if not altogether unambiguous, limiting
arguments [66, p. 62] [emphasis added–authors],
whereas in point of fact, limits appear in Cauchy’s definition only in
the sense of the endpoints of the domain of definition. Analogous mis-
conceptions in Gilain are analyzed in Subsection 3.1.11 Similar post-
Weierstrassian sentiments were expressed by editor Michel Blay’s ref-
eree for the periodical Revue d’histoire des sciences where the present
article was submitted for publication in 2010, and rejected based on
the following assessment by referee 1:12
Our author interprets A. Cauchy’s approach as a forma-
tion of the idea of an infinitely small - a variant of the
approach which was developed in the XXth century in
the framework of the nonstandard analysis (a hyperreal
version of E. Hewitt, J. Los, A. Robinson).
The referee’s summary is an inaccurate description of the text refer-
eed. Cauchy’s approach is not a variant of Robinson’s, and was never
claimed to be in this text. Based on such a strawman version of the
article’s conception, the referee came to the following conclusion:
From my point of view the author’s arguments to sup-
port this conception are quite unconvincing.
Indeed, we find such such a strawman conception unconvincing, but the
conception was the referee’s, not the authors’. The referee concluded
as follows:
The fact that the actual infinitesimals lived somewhere
in the consciousness of A. Cauchy (as in many another
mathematicians of XIXth - XXth centuries as, for exam-
ple, N.N. Luzin) does not abolish his (and theirs) con-
stant aspiration to dislodge them in the subconscious-
ness and to found the calculus on the theory of limit.13
Did Cauchy have a “constant aspiration to dislodge infinitesimals in the
subconsciousness and to found the calculus on the theory of limit”?
Certainly not. Felix Klein knew better: fifty years before Robinson,
Klein clearly realized the potential of the infinitesimal approach to
the foundations. Having outlined the developments in real analysis
associated with Weierstrass and his followers, Klein pointed out that
11See [77, 75] for further discussion of the post-Weierstrassian bias in Cauchy
scholarship.
12The pdf of the version submitted to Blay, as well as the two referee reports,
may be found at http://u.cs.biu.ac.il/∼katzmik/straw.html
13Opposing infinitesimals and limits is in itself a conceptual error; see footnote 33.
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The scientific mathematics of today is built upon the
series of developments which we have been outlining.
But an essentially different conception of infinitesimal
calculus has been running parallel with this [conception]
through the centuries [86, p. 214].
Such a different conception, according to Klein, “harks back to old
metaphysical speculations concerning the structure of the continuum
according to which this was made up of [. . . ] infinitely small parts”
[86, p. 214].14
Cauchy did not aspire to dislodge infinitesimals from analysis; on the
contrary, he used them with increasing frequency in his work, including
his 1853 article [28] where he relied on infinitesimals to express the
property of uniform convergence, as we analyze in Subsection 2.4.
2.2. How does a null sequence become a Cauchy infinitesimal?
The nature of Cauchy’s infinitesimals has been the subject of an on-
going debate for a number of decades. Post-Weierstrassian historians
tend to dismiss Cauchy’s infiniment petits as merely a linguistic de-
vice masking Cauchy’s use of the limit concept. From this perspective,
Cauchy’s infinitesimals are alleged to represent an early anticipation of
the more rigorous methods developed in the second half of the 19th cen-
tury, namely epsilontic analysis. Hourya Benis Sinaceur [123] presented
a critical analysis of the proto-Weierstrassian approach to Cauchy in
1973, pointing out in particular that Cauchy’s notion of limit is for the
most part a kinetic one rather than an epsilontic one.15 Other historians
have taken Cauchy’s infinitesimals at face value, see e.g., Lakatos [89],
Laugwitz [91]. The studies in the past decade include Sad, Teixeira,
and Baldino [116], Br˚ating [22], and Katz & Katz [75].
14Klein also formulated a criterion of what it would take for a theory of infinites-
imals to be successful. Namely, one must be able to prove a mean value theorem for
arbitrary intervals, including infinitesimal ones. In 1928, A. Fraenkel [49, pp. 116-
117] formulated a similar requirement in terms of the mean value theorem. Such
a Klein-Fraenkel criterion is satisfied by the Hewitt- Los´-Robinson theory by the
transfer principle, see Appendix A.
15Pourciau [109] argues that Newton possessed a clear kinetic conception of limit
similar to Cauchy’s, and cites Newton’s lucid statement to the effect that “Those
ultimate ratios . . . are not actually ratios of ultimate quantities, but limits . . . which
they can approach so closely that their difference is less than any given quantity. . . ”
See Newton [106, p. 39] and [107, p. 442]. The same point, and the same passage
from Newton, appeared a century earlier in Russell [114, item 316, p. 338-339]. See
also footnote 33.
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To what extent did Cauchy intend the process that he described as
a null sequence “becoming” an infinitesimal, to involve some kind of a
collapsing?
Cauchy did not have access to the modern set theoretic mentality
(currently dominant in the area of mathematics), where equivalence
relation and quotient space constructions are taken for granted. One
can still ponder the following question: to what extent may Cauchy
have anticipated such collapsing phenomena?
Part of the difficulty in answering such a question is Cauchy’s hands-
on approach to foundations. Cauchy was less interested in founda-
tional issues than, say, Bolzano.16 To Cauchy, getting your sedan out
of the garage was the only justification for shoveling away the snow
that blocks the garage door. Once the door open, Cauchy is in top
gear within seconds, solving problems and producing results. To him,
infinitesimals were the asphalt under the snow, not the snow itself.
Bolzano wanted to shovel away all the snow from the road. Half a
century later, the triumvirate17 shovel ripped out the asphalt together
with the snow, intent on consigning the infinitesimal to the dustbin of
history.
For these reasons, it is not easy to gauge Cauchy’s foundational
stance precisely. For instance, is there evidence that he felt that two
null sequences that coincide except for a finite number of terms, would
“generate” the same infinitesimal?18 Support for this idea comes from
several sources, including a very unlikely one, namely Felscher’s es-
say [46] in The American Mathematical Monthly from 2000, where he
attacks both Laugwitz’s interpretation and the idea that infinitesimals
play a foundational role in Cauchy.19
In his zeal to do away with Cauchy’s infinitesimals, Felscher seeks
to describe them in terms of the modern terminology of germs . Here
two sequences are in the same germ if they agree at infinity, i.e., for
all sufficiently large values of the index n of the sequence 〈un : n ∈ N〉,
16Thus, Hourya Benis Sinaceur writes: “Bolzano est avant tout pre´occupe´ de
rigueur the´orique, d’ou` le soucit constant de de´monstrations formelles [. . . ] Cauchy,
au contraire, donne rarement des de´monstrations en forme [. . . ] Son expose´ a
davantage des qualite´s de synthe`se que de rigueur formelle” [123, p. 102].
17Boyer [19, p. 298] refers to Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass as “the great
triumvirate”.
18Note that the term “generate” was used by K. Br˚ating [22] to describe the
passage from sequence to infinitesimal in Cauchy.
19Felscher’s text is examined in more detail in Subsection 3.2.
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that is, are equal almost everywhere.20 Felscher’s maneuver success-
fully eliminates the term “infinitesimal” from the picture, but has the
effect of undermining Felscher’s own thesis, by lending support to the
presence of such “collapsing” in Cauchy.
Indeed, the idea of reading germs of sequences into Cauchy is pre-
cisely Laugwitz’s thesis in [90, p. 272]. Germs of sequences are also the
basis of Laugwitz’s Ω-calculus [117], a ring constructed using a Fre´chet
filter.21
In an editorial footnote to Lakatos’s essay, J. Cleave outlines a non-
Archimedean system developed by Chwistek [29], involving a quotient
by a Fre´chet filter (similarly to the Schmieden–Laugwitz construc-
tion). Cleave then concludes that the relation of such infinitesimals
to Cauchy’s is “obvious”.22 To us it appears that the said relation
requires additional argument.
Cauchy’s published work contains evidence that he intuitively sensed
a “collapsing” involved in the passage from a null sequence to an in-
finitesimal. Thus, the second chapter of the Cours d’Analyse [24] of
1821 contains a series of theorems (eight of them) whose main purpose
appears to be to emphasize the importance of the asymptotic behavior
of the sequence (i.e., as the index tends to infinity). This thread is
pursued in more detail in Subsection 2.3. Furthermore, he refers to
his infinitesimals as “quantities”, a term he uses in the context of an
ordered number system, as opposed to the complex numbers which are
always “expressions” but never “quantities”. In fact, the recent Eng-
lish translation [21] of the Cours d’Analyse erroneously translates one
20Equality “almost everywhere” is a 20th century concept; Felscher seems to
suggest that Cauchy thought of the relation between his variable quantities and his
infinitesimals in a way that would be later described as equality almost everywhere.
21In the Schmieden–Laugwitz construction, a Fre´chet filter is used where an
ultrafilter would be used in a hyperreal construction; see Appendix A.
22Cleave writes in his footnote 32*: “A construction of non-standard analysis is
given in Chwistek [29] (1948) which is derived from a paper published in 1926. It
is basically the reduced power RN/F where F is the Fre´chet filter on the natural
numbers (the collection of cofinite sets of natural numbers) (see Frayne, Morel,
and Scott [50]) [. . . ] This particular construction is not an elementary extension
of R but there are sufficiently powerful transfer properties to enable some non-
standard analysis to be performed. It may be observed that the elements of RN/F
are equivalence classes of sequences of reals, two sequences s1, s2 . . . and t1, t2, . . .
being counted equal if for some n, sm = tm for all m ≥ n. The relation of these
classes to Cauchy’s variables is obvious” [89, p. 160].
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of Cauchy’s complex “expressions” as a “quantity”, and the reviewer
for Zentralblatt dutifully notes this error.23
A second aspect of collapsing is the mental transformation of the
process of “tending to zero” into a concept/noun (as a null sequence is
transformed into an infinitesimal), thought of as a reification, or encap-
sulation, of a highly compressed process.24 In the successive theorems
in his Chapter 2, Cauchy seeks to collapse the initial articulation of his
infinitesimal α as a temporally-deployed process , by deliberately leav-
ing out the implied index (i.e. label of the terms of the sequence), and
by explicitly specifying and emphasizing a rival index: the exponent
in a power αn of the infinitesimal, thought of as an infinitesimal of a
higher and higher order.
We will examine Cauchy’s approach further in Section 2.3 by means
of a detailed analysis of his text.
2.3. An analysis of Cours d’Analyse and its infinitesimals. We
will refer to the pages in the Cours d’Analyse [24] itself, rather than
the collected works.
Cauchy’s Chapter 2, section 1 starts on page 26. Here Cauchy writes
that a variable quantity becomes infinitely small if, etc. Here “infinitely
small” is an adjective, and is not used as a noun-adjective pair.
On page 27, Cauchy employs the noun-adjective combination, by
referring to “infinitely small quantities” (quantite´s infiniment petites ,
still in the feminine). He denotes such a quantity α. Note that the
index in the implied sequence is suppressed (namely, α appears without
a lower index).25
On page 28, he introduces a competing numerical index, namely the
exponent, by forming the infinitesimals
α, α2, α3, . . .
By the time we reach the bottom of the page (fourth line from the
bottom), he is already employing “infinitely small” as a noun in its
own right: infiniment petits (in the masculine plural).
On page 29, Theorem 1 asserts that a highest-order infinitesimal will
be smaller than all the others (infinitesimals are consistently referred
23The reviewer, Reinhard Siegmund-Schultze, was far more sensitive to Cauchy’s
infinitesimals on this occasion than in an earlier instance, occasioned by a review
of Felscher’s text; see footnote 56.
24In the education literature, such a compressing phenomenon is studied un-
der the name of procept (process+concept) [65], encapsulation [38], and reifica-
tion [120].
25Note that Cauchy uses lower indices to indicate terms in a sequence in his
proof of the intermediate value theorem [24, Note III, p. 462].
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independent variable
increment (∆x)
dependent variable
increment (∆y)
Cauchy’s first
definition
infinitesimal variable tending to
zero
Cauchy’s second
definition
infinitesimal infinitesimal
Table 1. Cauchy’s first two definitions of continuity in
1821 are of the form “if ∆x is . . ., then ∆y is . . .”. Note
the prevalence of the term “infinitesimal”.
to in the masculine). The theorem has not yet chosen a letter label for
the competing index (i.e. order of infinitesimal).
Still on page 29, Theorem 2 for the first time introduces a label for
the order of the infinitesimal, namely the letter n, as in
αn.
On page 30, Theorem 3 introduces several different letter indices:
n, n′, n′′ . . .
for the orders of his infinitesimals. The theorem concerns the order of
the sum, again compelling the student to focus on the competing or-
ders (at the expense of the suppressed index of the “variable quantity”
itself).
Still on page 30, Theorem 4 introduces the terminology of polynomi-
als in α, and describes their orders n, n′, n′′ . . . for the first time as a
“sequence”. We now have two “sequences”: (the variable quantity) α
itself, whose index is implicit (was never labeled), and the sequence
of orders, which are both emphasized and elaborately labeled using
“primes” ′ and double primes ′′.
In all these theorems, it is the asymptotic behavior of null sequences
that is constantly emphasized, which suggests that Cauchy might have
found it perfectly natural to identify/collapse sequences that agree al-
most everywhere. Terminology finit par eˆtre, finit par devenir (sugges-
tive of such collapse) is employed repeatedly.
On pages 31 and 32, three additional theorems and one corollary are
stated, for a total of eight results on the asymptotic behavior of such
null sequences.
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By the time Cauchy reaches Section 2 of Chapter 2 on page 34
(concerning continuity of functions), he has already encapsulated the
process implied in the notion of “variable quantity”, into the con-
cept/masculine noun infiniment petit . When he evokes an infinitely
small x-increment α, only a stubborn Weierstrassian will refuse to in-
terpret his α as a concept/noun. The second definition (out of the three
definitions of continuity given here) is the one Cauchy italicizes, imply-
ing it is the main one. Here both the x-increment and the y-increment
are described as infinitely small increments (see Table 1).
In this context, the verb “become” is being used in two different
senses:
(a) the terms in the sequence become smaller than any number;
(b) the encapsulating sense of a process being compressed into (and
thus becoming) a concept/noun,
as analyzed by Sad, Teixeira, and Baldino [116], who employed the ter-
minology of a transformation of essence. It is interesting to note that
Bolzano fought against the sense (a), by suppressing the parametrisa-
tion altogether, and viewing the null sequence as a set (perhaps he was
influenced by Zeno paradoxes), but not against the sense (b).
Note Cauchy’s emphasis on the noun aspect of his infinitesimals:
Lorsque les valeurs nume´riques26 successives d’une meˆme
variable de´croissent inde´finiment, de manie`re a` s’abaisser
au-dessous de tout nombre donne´, cette variable devient
ce qu’on nomme un infiniment petit ou une quantite´ in-
finiment petite. Une variable de cette espe`ce a ze´ro pour
limite [24, p. 4].
The use of the noun, un infiniment petit , makes it difficult to interpret
the “becoming” in the sense (a) above; rather, the definition requires
sense (b) to be grammatically coherent. Here the variable [quantity]
becomes a masculine noun: un infiniment petit . Cauchy is very precise
here: it is the limit of the variable that’s zero. The variable itself
becomes an infiniment petit . Cauchy wrote neither that a variable is
an infinitesimal, nor that the limit of the infinitesimal is zero, but rather
that the limit of the variable is zero, cf. [116, p. 301-302].
Once the use of infiniment petit as a noun is established, Cauchy
freely uses the term interchangeably as a noun or as an adjective.
Cauchy’s Cours d’Analyse presented only a theory of infinitesimals
of polynomial rate of growth as compared to a given α. His theory of
infinitesimals of more general order, and its influence on later authors
26The meaning of the expression valeur nume´rique is subject to debate; see next
section and footnote 42.
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such as E. Borel, was already discussed in Section 1;27 see Section 4 for
a broader historical perspective. In Subsection 2.4, we will discuss a
specific application Cauchy makes of his infinitesimals, in the context
of the sum theorem.
2.4. Microcontinuity and Cauchy’s sum theorem. How is Cauchy
able to define concepts such as uniform continuity and uniform conver-
gence in terms of a single variable, unlike standard definitions thereof
which call for a pair of variables?
Let x be in the domain of a function f , and consider the following
condition, which we will call microcontinuity at x:
“if x′ is in the domain of f and x′ is infinitely close to x,
then f(x′) is infinitely close to f(x)”.
Then ordinary continuity of f is equivalent to f being microcontinuous
on the Archimedean continuum (A-continuum for short), i.e., at every
point x of its domain in the A-continuum. Meanwhile, uniform conti-
nuity of f is equivalent to f being microcontinuous on the Bernoulian
continuum (B-continuum for short), i.e., at every point x of its domain
in the B-continuum (the relation of the two continua is discussed in
more detail in Appendix A).
Consider, for example, the function sin(1/x) defined for positive x.
The function fails to be uniformly continuous because microcontinuity
fails at a positive infinitesimal x (due to ever more rapid oscillation).
The function x2 fails to be uniformly continuous because of the failure
of microcontinuity at an infinite member of the B-continuum.
A similar distinction exists between pointwise convergence and uni-
form convergence.28 Which condition did Cauchy have in mind in 1821?
Abel interpreted it as convergence on the A-continuum, and presented
“exceptions” (what we would call today counterexamples) in 1826. Ad-
ditional such exceptions were published by Seidel and Stokes in the
1840s.
Cauchy’s contemporary E. G. Bjo¨rling anticipated the B-continuum
definition in a remarkable passage dating from 1852:
when one comes to show that in a series, of which the
terms are functions of a quantity x, converges [. . . ] for
each given value of x up to a certain limit X , it is not
necessary to believe that the series continues necessarily
to converge [. . . ] for values of x indefinitely close to that
27See also the main text following footnote 8.
28See e.g., Goldblatt [59, Theorem 7.12.2, p. 87].
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limit (Bjo¨rling [12, p. 455], as cited by Grattan-Guinness
[63, p. 232]).
Here the “limit” X is clearly a member of the usual Archimedean
continuum; but what is the nature of the x mentioned at the end
of Bjo¨rling’s phrase? Bjorling’s reference to convergence at x implies
that x is understood to be an individual/atomic element of the domain;
yet speaking of x as being “indefinitely close” to X is meaningless in
the context of an A-continuum. One faces a stark choice of either toe-
ing the triumvirate line on the “true” continuum and therefore finding
Bjo¨rling’s arguments “absurd”, as Pringsheim did [110, p. 345];29 or,
removing the blinders so as to envision a mid-19th century anticipation
of an infinitesimal-enriched continuum.
Cauchy clarified/modified his position on the sum theorem in 1853.30
In his text [28], he specified a stronger condition of convergence on the
B-continuum, including at x = 1
n
(explicitly mentioned by Cauchy).
The stronger condition bars Abel’s counterexample.
To give a more detailed explanation of Cauchy’s 1853 text, note that
Cauchy’s approach is based on two assumptions which can be stated
in modern terminology as follows:
(1) when you have a closed expression for a function, then its values
at “variable quantities” (such as x = 1
n
) are calculated by using
the same closed expression as at real values;
(2) to evaluate a function at a variable quantity generated by a
sequence, one evaluates term-by-term.
Now in 1853 Cauchy analyzed Abel’s counterexample (without men-
tioning Abel’s name) by first writing down the closed form of the sum
of the remainder of the series. This is given by a certain integral. He
proceeded to evaluate it at an infinitesimal x = 1
n
using assumption (1).
Concretely, he substituted the values 1
n
into the closed expression (in-
tegral) using assumption (2). The sequence he got was not a null
sequence. He concluded that the remainder term at this particular in-
finitesimal is not an infinitesimal. Hence, he concluded, the “always”
part of his hypothesis is not satisfied by Abel’s example.
Thus, Cauchy’s clarification/modification from 1853 amounts to re-
quiring convergence on an incipient form of a B-continuum. Some his-
torians acknowledge his clarification/modification, and interpret it as
the addition of the condition of uniform convergence, while adhering to
an A-continuum framework. The recent text [75] argued that such an
29As cited by Grattan-Guinness [63, p. 233].
30Grattan-Guinness [63] and Br˚ating [22] argue that Cauchy was influenced by
Bjo¨rling.
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interpretation is problematic. Namely, Cauchy states the condition in
terms of a single variable, whereas the traditional definition of uniform
continuity or convergence in the context of an A-continuum necessarily
requires a pair of variables. Cauchy specifically evokes x = 1
n
where
Abel’s “exception/counterexample” fails to converge. The matter is
discussed in detail by K. Br˚ating [22].
2.5. Five common misconceptions in the Cauchy literature.
Both Laugwitz and Hourya Benis Sinaceur [123] have exposed a number
of misconceptions in the literature concerning Cauchy’s foundational
work. Five of the most common ones are reproduced below in italics.
1. Bolzano, Cauchy, and Weierstrass were all gardeners who con-
tributed to the ripening of the fruit of the notion of limit.
Here the implicit assumption is that the Weierstrassian epsilontic
notion of “limit” in the context of an Archimedean continuum is the
centerpiece of any possible edifice of analysis. Such an assumption
is questionable on two counts. First, as Felix Klein pointed out in
1908, there are two parallel threads in the development of analysis,
one based on an Archimedean continuum, and the other exploiting
an infinitesimal-enriched continuum.31 One risks pre-judging the out-
come of any analysis of Cauchy by postulating that he is working in
the Archimedean thread. The second implicit assumption is that the
Weierstrassian notion of limit is central in Cauchy. Thus, Boyer [19,
p. 277] postulates that Cauchy is working with a notion of limit simi-
lar to the Weierstrassian one. This requires further argument, and at
least at first glance is incorrect: Cauchy emphasizes infinitesimals as a
foundational notion, but he never emphasizes limits as a foundational
notion. Thus, in Cauchy’s definition of continuity the word “limit”
does occur, but only in the sense of the “endpoint” of the interval of
definition of the function, rather than the behavior of its values.32
2. Cauchy, along with other mathematicians, abandoned infinitesimals
in favor of other more rigorous notions.
During the period 1814-1820, Cauchy appears to have been ambiva-
lent about infinitesimals. Starting in about 1821, he uses them with
increasing frequency both in his textbooks and his research publica-
tions, and insists on the centrality of infinitesimals as a foundational
notion; see Section 4 for a related chronology.
31See material in the main text around footnote 14.
32The misconception may be found, for instance, in J. Gray, see main text around
footnote 11.
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3. Cauchy was forced to teach infinitesimals at the Ecole.
The intended implication appears to be that Cauchy only used in-
finitesimals because of the pressure from the Ecole administration.
During the period 1814-1820 there were some tensions with the admin-
istration over the delayed appearance of infinitesimals in the syllabus,
see [54]. At any rate, Cauchy continued using infinitesimals thoughout
his career and long after completing his teaching stint at the Ecole in
1830. Thus he reproduces his 1821 definition of continuity (in terms of
infinitesimals) as late as 1853, in his text on the sum theorem [28], see
Subsection 2.4.
4. Cauchy based his infinitesimals on the notion of limit.
This is an ambiguous claim, and essentially a play on words on the
term “limit”. The modern audience understands “limit” as a Weier-
strassian epsilontic notion. If this is what is claimed, then the claim is
false. As far as the kinetic notion of limit that Cauchy does mention in
discussing a variable quantity approaching a limit, it is conspicuously
absent in Cauchy’s discussion of infinitesimals. Thus, rather than in-
finitesimals being based on the notion of limit, it is the notion of a
variable quantity that’s primitive, and both infinitesimals and limits
are defined in terms of it (see Subsection 3.1 for a more detailed dis-
cussion). Note again that the term “limit” does appear in Cauchy’s
definition of continuity, but in an entirely different sense, namely end-
point of the interval where the function is defined.33
5. Cauchy introduced rigor into calculus that anticipates the rigor of
Weierstrass.
While Cauchy certainly emphasizes rigor, postulating a continuity
between Cauchy’s rigor and Weierstrassian rigor is a methodological
33To elaborate, we will note that the purported opposition between infinitesimals
and limits (a frequently found claim in the literature) is a conceptual error in its
own right. The opposition is not between limits and infinitesimals. Limits are
present in both approaches. In the infinitesimal approach, limits can be defined in
terms of the standard part function, and the latter in terms of limits. The true
opposition is between infinitesimals, on the one hand, and epsilon-delta with its
quantifier complications, on the other. The preoccupation with the word “limit”
can be exposed as a purely linguistic one by the following thought experiment, based
on Pourciau’s lucid analysis, see footnote 15. Imagine that Newton had developed
an “ult” notation for his ultimate ratios, e.g., ulth→0
f(x+h)−f(x)
h
for the derivative,
and ultn→∞
∑n
i=1 f(xi)∆x for the integral. Post-Weierstrassian historians would
then perhaps be more moderate in their enthusiasm for the vague musings about
limits (incorrectly) attributed to d’Alembert, see Subsection 3.3.
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error.34 To Cauchy, rigor meant abandoning the principle of the “gen-
erality of algebra” as practiced by Euler, Lagrange, and others, and its
replacement by geometry–and by infinitesimals.
3. Comments by modern authors
In this section, we analyze some comments by modern authors re-
lated to Cauchy’s foundational contribution.
3.1. Gilain’s limit. C. Gilain affirms the following:
On sait que Cauchy de´finissait le concept d’infiniment
petit a` l’aide du concept de limite, qui avait le premier
roˆle35 (voir Analyse alge´brique, p. 19 . . . )” [54, foot-
note 67].
Here Gilain is referring to Cauchy’s Collected Works, Se´rie 2, Tome 3,
p. 19, corresponding to [24, p. 4]. Both of Gilain’s claims are erroneous,
as we now show. Cauchy starts by discussing variable quantities as a
primary notion, in the following terms:
On nomme quantite´ variable celle que l’on conside`re
comme devant rec¸evoir successivement plusieurs valeurs
diffe´rentes les unes des autres.
Next, Cauchy exploits his primary notion to evoke his kinetic concept
of limit36 in the following terms:
Lorsque les valeurs successivement attribue´es a` une meˆme
variable s’approchent inde´finiment d’une valeur fixe, de
manie`re a` finir par en diffe´rer par aussi peu qu l’on
voudra, cette dernie`re est appele´e la limite de toutes
les autres.
Finally, Cauchy proceeds to define infinitesimals in the following terms:
Lorsque les valeurs nume´riques successives d’une meˆme
variable de´croissent inde´finiment, de manie`re a` s’abaisser
au-dessous de tout nombre donne´, cette variable devient
ce qu’on nomme un infiniment petit ou une quantite´ in-
finiment petite. Une variable de cette espe`ce a ze´ro pour
limite.37
34See Klein’s comments discussed in the main text around footnote 14, concern-
ing the two parallel strands for the development of analysis.
35“We know that Cauchy defined the concept of infinitely small by means of the
concept of limit, which played the primary role.”
36Such a concept is similar to Newton’s, see footnote 15.
37This definition was already analyzed in Subsection 2.3, see main text around
footnote 26.
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Thus, Cauchy defined both infinitesimals and limits in terms of variable
quantities. Neither is the limit concept primary, nor are infinitesimals
defined in terms of limits, contrary to Gilain’s claims.38
3.2. Felscher’s Bestiarium infinitesimale. We have argued for an
interpretation of Cauchy’s foundational stance that endeavors to take
Cauchy’s infinitesimals at their face value. Such an interpretation has
not been without its detractors. A decade ago, W. Felscher [46] set
out to investigate Cauchy’s continuity, in an 18-page text, marred by
an odd focus on d’Alembert.39 To be sure, it is both legitimate and
necessary to examine Cauchy’s predecessors, including d’Alembert, if
one wishes to understand Cauchy himself. Indeed, a debate of long
standing (over a century long, in fact) had opposed two rival method-
ologies in the study of the foundations of the new science of Newton
and Leibniz:
(A) a methodology eschewing infinitesimals; and
(B) a methodology favoring them.40
It is legitimate to ask which of the two methodologies is the one that
underpins Cauchy’s oeuvre. However, Felscher’s conceptual framework
is flawed in a fundamental way. The outcome of his investigation is
predetermined from the outset by the following two factors:
(1) Felscher’s exclusive focus on d’Alembert,41 one of the radical
adherents of the A-methodology, and
(2) Felscher’s postulating a methodological continuity between the
work of d’Alembert and Cauchy (see also Subsection 3.3).
Displaying a masterly command of scholarly Latin, Felscher offers the
reader a glimpse of the bestiarium infinitesimale in section 6 of his
essay, starting on page 856. The punchline comes in the middle of
page 857, where Felscher points out that Cauchy refers specifically to
numerical values of his variables, the latter being described by Cauchy
as becoming infinitesimals.
The adjective numerical is linked etymologically to the noun number .
Cauchy’s numbers (unlike his quantities) are certainly appreciable (i.e.,
neither infinitesimal nor infinite, nor even negative), as can be seen
by reading the first page Pre´liminaires of his 1821 Cours D’Analyse.
38For a similar misconception in Smithies, see footnote 4.
39Felix Klein [86, p. 103] discusses the error in d’Alembert’s proof of the funda-
mental theorem of algebra, first noticed by Gauss.
40See Felix Klein’s comments discussed in the main text around footnote 14.
41Felscher mentions Euler and the Bernoullis in his section entitled D’Alembert’s
program, but says not a word about them in his article.
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Felscher concludes that the variables assume only appreciable values,
but not non-Archimedean ones.42
Felscher’s etymological insight offers a refutation of the Luzin hy-
pothesis,43 to the effect that Cauchy variables may pass through non-
Archimedean values on their way to zero. Has Felscher shown that
Cauchy’s bestiarium infinitesimale is in fact uninhabited?
Hardly so. While chasing out the infinitesimal mouse of Luzin’s hy-
pothesis44 for the Cauchy variable, Felscher missed the elephant of the
possibility of the variable becoming an infinitesimal through a process
of reification (see Subsection 2.2).
On page 846, Felscher quotes an agitated passage from d’Alembert’s
1754 article. D’Alembert attacks the obscurity , and even the falsehood
of a definition of infinitesimals attributed to unnamed geometers, and
sums up his thesis by accusing such geometers of charlatanerie, a term
ably translated as quackery by Felscher, who sums up as follows:
Reading these words today we may get the impression
that they were written at the time of Weierstrass or
Cantor,45 or even by a contemporary mathematician.46
42Note that Schubring [118, p. 446], in footnote 14, explains Cauchy’s term nu-
merical value as what we would call today the absolute value. Fisher [47, p. 262]
interprets Cauchy’s definition accordingly, so as to allow room for infinitesimal
values of Cauchy’s variables. See also footnote 44 on Cleave.
43Luzin himself, in fact, similarly rejected non-Archimedean time, as discussed
by Medvedev [102].
44Luzin was probably not the first and surely not the last to formulate a hy-
pothesis to the effect that Cauchy’s variable quantities pass through infinitesimal
values on their way to zero. Lakatos [89, p. 153] speculates that Cauchy’s vari-
ables “ran through Weierstrassian real numbers and infinitesimals”, while J. Cleave
(who edited Lakatos’s essay for publication in the Mathematical Intelligencer) in
footnote 18* in [89, p. 159] disagrees, limiting Cauchy variables to sequences of
Weierstrassian reals (Cleave quotes the relevant passage on numerical values but
does not analyze it here). Cleave alludes to the etymological point in [30, p. 268],
where he disagrees with Fisher on this point.
45Cantor was indeed a worthy heir to d’Alembert’s anti-infinitesimal vitriol. Can-
tor dubbed infinitesimals the cholera bacillus of mathematics, see J. Dauben [33,
p. 353], [34, p. 124], H. Meschkowski [104, p. 505]. This was perhaps the most
vitriolic opposition to the B-continuum (see Appendix A) prior to Errett Bishop’s
debasement of meaning, a term he applied to classical mathematics in general in
1973 [11], and to infinitesimal calculus a` la Robinson in particular, in 1975 [10], see
[77] and [76] for details.
46It is worth pondering which contemporary mathematician (known for anti-
infinitesimal vitriol) Felscher may have had in mind here, given his interest in
intuitionistic logics [44, 45], see also [76].
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It is sobering to realize that, forty years after A. Robinson, a logician
named Walter Felscher still conceived of the history of analysis in terms
of a triumphant march out of the dark age of the infinitesimal, and
toward the yawning heights of Weierstrassian epsilontics.
D’Alembert’s verbal excesses merely put in relief the fact that no
such rhetoric is to be found anywhere in either Cauchy or Bolzano.
Felscher presents a convincing case that d’Alembert was opposed to
infinitesimals. Felscher’s title Bolzano, Cauchy, epsilon, delta47 could
therefore have pertinently been replaced by D’Alembert, Weierstrass,
epsilon, delta, as the case for Bolzano’s opposition to infinitesimals can
similarly be challenged.48 Indeed, as Lakatos points out,
[Bolzano] was possibly the only one to see the problems
related to the difference between the two continuums:
the rich Leibnizian continuuum and, as he called it, its
‘measurable’ subset–the set of Weierstrassian real num-
bers. Bolzano makes it very clear that the field of ‘mea-
surable numbers’49 constitutes only an Archimedean sub-
set of a continuum enriched by non-measurable - infin-
itely small or infinitely large - quantities [89, p. 154].
D. Kurepa [87, p. 664] provides some details on Bolzano’s use of in-
finitesimals. As far as epsilon-delta techniques are concerned, a case for
Bolzano’s anticipation thereof is far more convincing than for Cauchy.50
47Apparently, a kind of a mantra: Bolzano, Cauchy, epsilon, delta; Bolzano,
Cauchy, epsilon, delta; . . . which, repeated sufficiently many times, would lead
one to accept Felscher’s reduction of Cauchy’s continuum to an A-continuum (see
Appendix A).
48In discussing Bolzano’s attitude toward infinitesimals, we have to distinguish
between the early Bolzano and the late Bolzano. The early Bolzano defines the
“Infinitely small” as “variable quantities” in the following terms: A quantity is
infinitely small if it becomes less than any given quantity (here Bolzano does not
speak of “values” [but naturally he thought of them]). The late Bolzano definies
infinitely small (and infinitely large) numbers ; one of them is 1/(1 + 1 + 1 + . . .)
(infinitely many terms). We are grateful to D. Spalt for this historical clarification.
49Measurable number is Bolzano’s term for appreciable number (no relation to
Lebesgue-measurability). Here Bolzano foreshadows Bjo¨rling’s dichotomy (see [22]),
which can be analyzed in terms of A- and B-continua (see Appendix A).
50Hourya Benis Sinaceur wrote: “les oeuvres de Bolzano et de Cauchy
repre´sentent deux courants distincts, he´te´rogene`s a` l’origine, et qui ne se rencon-
trent pas avant les anne´es 1870, avec les travaux de Weierstrass, Cantor, etc. Seule
l’illusion re´trospective et une connaissance indirecte des textes permettent de les
amalgamer dans un meˆme cours ininterrompu suppose´ traverser tout le XIXe sie`cle”
[123, p. 111], and cites a letter of H. A. Schwarz to Cantor [119] to the effect that “la
me´thode de de´monstration [. . . ] de Weierstrass est un de´veloppement des principes
de Bolzano” [123, p. 112].
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Felscher’s intriguing parenthetical remark indicates that he was more
sensitive to Cauchy’s language than numerous Cauchy historians:
it is left open whether a quantite´ variable, with an as-
signment converging to zero, actually is or only becomes
a quantite´ infiniment petite [46, p. 850].
On page 851, Felscher presents an analysis of Cauchy’s use of an in-
finitesimal quantity, denoted i, in differentiating an exponential func-
tion. Here Felscher’s additional parenthetical remark, to the effect that
“notational confusion arises from denoting both the variable i and its
values by the same letter”, is an unjustified criticism of Cauchy. The
criticism underscores Felscher’s insensitivity toward the dynamic as-
pect of Cauchy’s infinitesimal i, when individual values are irrelevant
in the context of the dynamism of the encapsulation taking place when-
ever Cauchy evokes an infinitesimal. Otherwise Felscher’s analysis is
unexceptionable, save for a non-sequitur of a conclusion:
“No ‘infinitesimal’ non-Archimedean numbers are ever
used by Cauchy for his quantite´s infiniment petites .”
In reality, Cauchy’s discussion of the derivative of the exponential func-
tion admits a number of possible interpretations.
On page 852, Felscher analyzes Cauchy’s infinitesimals in modern
terms:
Using today’s terminology, one would describe Cauchy’s
forms to be filled by assignments as functions, but in or-
der to distinguish them from the actual functions sub-
sequently considered by Cauchy, one might call them
functional germs . [Emphasis in the original–authors]
Felscher mentions Cauchy’s use of functional germs again on page 855.
In his zeal to rename Cauchy’s infinitesimals by employing a modern
notion, so as bashfully to avoid the distasteful infi term, Felscher comes
close to endorsing Laugwitz’s “Cauchy numbers”, similarly defined in
terms of germs.
Thus, Laugwitz wrote:
Every real function f(u) defined on an interval 0 < u <
p represents a Cauchy number. Two such functions f(u)
and g(u) represent the same Cauchy number if and only
if there is an interval 0 < u < q in which f(u) = g(u)
[93, p. 659].
Note that Laugwitz essentially defines his “Cauchy numbers” by ex-
ploiting the concept of the germ of a function; Laugwitz explicitly
mentions function germs in [90, p. 272]. Felscher [46, p. 858] leaves
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very little doubt as to how he felt with regard to Laugwitz infinitesi-
mals:
In this connection one must also mention certain articles
and books by D. Laugwitz, in which [. . . ] he develops
his own ‘mathematics of the infinitesimal’ and uses it to
interpret skillfully various aspects of the mathematics
of the period from Euler to Cauchy. And so we have
glanced at the bestiarium infinitesimale.51
On page 853, Felscher omits a crucial first phrase used by Cauchy in
formulating his first definition of continuity. Namely, he omits Cauchy’s
phrase stating that α is an infinitesimal , corresponding to the upper-
left entry in Table 1.52
On pages 854-855, Felscher makes the following statement concerning
Cauchy’s notion of continuity :
Both Bolzano and Cauchy gave definitions of continu-
ity which express today’s [. . . ] continuity. Both made
their definitions precise and used them in today’s sense;
both employed them by comparing numbers and their
distances with the help of inequalities in order to prove
important theorems in analysis. However, Cauchy de-
fined and used the notion of limit, whereas Bolzano did
not.
Felscher’s assertion concerning continuity and inequalities is mislead-
ing. Generally speaking, Cauchy’s limit concept is a kinetic one (see
Hourya Benis Sinaceur [123]), and is a derived notion, depending for
its definition on the primary notion of a variable quantity . On occa-
sion, Cauchy worked with real inequalities in proofs (see, e.g., Grabiner
[61]), but he never gave such a definition of continuity .
On page 855, line 9, Felscher alleges that Cauchy’s first definition
of continuity is similar to Bolzano’s, with the implication that the ter-
minology of “infinitesimal” is not employed by Cauchy. Now the form
in which Cauchy’s definition was quoted by Felscher two pages earlier
(see our comment above concerning Felscher’s page 853) did not em-
ploy infinitesimals. But the form in which it appears in Cauchy did
employ infinitesimals.53
51The reviewer for MathSciNet concurred, see Section 3.4.
52This crucial detail leads Felscher to a further error of a conceptual nature,
discussed below.
53See Table 1 (for a summary of Cauchy’s definitions) and footnote 52. Schubring
[118, p. 465] writes that J. Lu¨tzen’s is the best analysis of continuity in Cauchy.
Meanwhile, Lu¨tzen [97, p. 166] states: “Cauchy [. . . ] gives two definitions, first
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The most remarkable aspect of Felscher’s, unfortunately seriously
flawed, essay is how close he comes to sensing the cognitive view of
compression/encapsulation outlined in Subsection 2.2:
We speak of a function or a variable approaching some
value inde´finiment (indefinitely); we imagine a limiting
process. [. . . ] Thus far, ǫ and δ (and in case of sequences
also n and N) appear as handles affixed to the stages of
those infinite processes. It seems that if appropriately
handled in our mental exercises, they enable us to use
finitely many arguments to prove statements that, in the
end, speak about all the stages of the infinite process [46,
p. 858].
3.3. D’Alembert or de La Chapelle? Felscher’s text analyzed in
Section 3.2 describes d’Alembert as “one of the mathematicians rep-
resenting the heroic age of calculus” [46, p. 845]. Felscher buttresses
his claim by a lengthy quotation concerning the definition of the limit
concept, from the article Limite from the Encyclope´die ou Dictionnaire
Raisonne´ des Sciences, des Arts et des Me´tiers (volume 9 from 1765):
On dit qu’une grandeur est la limite d’une autre grandeur,
quand la seconde peut approcher de la premie`re plus
pre`s que d’une grandeur donne´e, si petite qu’on la puisse
supposer, sans pourtant que la grandeur qui approche,
puisse jamais surpasser la grandeur dont elle approche;
ensorte que la diffe´rence d’une pareille quantite´ a` sa lim-
ite est absolument inassignable (Encyclope´die, volume 9,
page 542).
One recognizes here a kinetic definition of limit already exploited by
I. Newton.54 Whatever the merits of attributing visionary status to
this quote, what Felscher overlooked is the fact that the article Limite
was written by two authors. In reality, the above passage defining
the concept of “limit” (as well as the two propositions on limits) did
not originate with d’Alembert, but rather with the encyclopedist Jean-
Baptiste de La Chapelle. De la Chapelle was recruited by d’Alembert
to write 270 articles for the Encyclope´die.
The section of the article contaning these items is signed (E) (at
bottom of first column of page 542), known to be de La Chapelle’s
“signature” in the Encyclopedie. Felscher had already committed a
one without infinitesimals, and then one using infinitesimals.” The second claim is
correct, but not the first.
54See footnote 15 on Pourciau’s analysis.
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similar error of attributing de la Chapelle’s work to d’Alembert, in his
1979 work [43].55 Note that Robinson [112, p. 267] similarly misat-
tributes this passage to d’Alembert.
3.4. Brilloue¨t-Belluot: epsilon-delta, period. An instructive case
study in a bestiarium-consignment attitude toward infinitesimals is the
review of Felscher’s text for Math Reviews, by one Nicole Brilloue¨t-
Belluot [23]. The review contains not an inkling of the fact that the
text in question is a broadside attack on scholars attempting to analyze
Cauchy’s infinitesimals seriously. The reviewer mentions the “epsilon-
delta technique”, and notes that Cauchy made his “definitions [of con-
tinuity] precise and used them in today’s sense”, but fails to mention
that the definitions in question are infinitesimal ones, a fact not denied
by Felscher (at least in the case of one of the definitions). Her review
mentions d’Alembert, who does not appear in Felscher’s summary, in-
dicating that she had read the body of Felscher’s text itself (rather
than merely Felscher’s summary).
Brilloue¨t-Belluot notes that Felscher reports on how “limit was ex-
plained and used by d’Alembert and Cauchy”. She reports neither on
Felscher’s extensive, and vitriolic, quotes from d’Alembert (including
the dramatic phrase “the metaphysics and the infinitely small quanti-
ties, whether larger or smaller than one another, are totally useless in
the differential calculus”), nor d’Alembert’s colorful epithets like char-
latanerie/quackery. The reviewer identified with Felscher’s conclusions
to such an extent that she chose to spare the Math Reviews reader
the burden of infinitesimal quackery, judging that Felscher carried that
burden once and for all, for the rest of us.56
3.5. Bos on preliminary explanation. Leibniz historian H. Bos ac-
knowledged that Robinson’s hyperreals provide a
preliminary explanation of why the calculus could de-
velop on the insecure foundation of the acceptance of
infinitely small and infinitely large quantities [18, p. 13].
3.6. Medvedev’s delicate question. Reviewer Cooke [31] notes that
Medvedev [101] “devotes considerable space to refuting the point of
view of modern analysis as a thing waiting to be born, which earlier
mathematicians were striving unsuccessfully to find and for lack of
55We are grateful to D. Spalt for this historical clarification.
56Similar remarks apply to the review of Felscher’s text by Reinhard Siegmund-
Schultze [122] for Zentralblatt Math. Siegmund-Schultze was far less myopic in
a later instance occasioned by a review of an English translation of the Cours
d’analyse, see footnote 23.
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which they were merely groping in the dark. In particular he argues
that the approaches of Cauchy and Weierstrass were so different from
each other that it would be more accurate to speak of two systems of
analysis.”
F. Medvedev further points out that nonstandard analysis
makes it possible to answer a delicate question bound up
with earlier approaches to the history of classical anal-
ysis. If infinitely small and infinitely large magnitudes
are [to be] regarded as inconsistent notions, how could
they [have] serve[d] as a basis for the construction of
so [magnificent] an edifice of one of the most important
mathematical disciplines? [101, 103]
A powerful question, indeed. How do historians answer Medvedev’s
question?
3.7. Grabiner’s “deep insight”. Not all scholars are satisfied with
the amazing-intuition-and-deep-insight answer offered by J. Grabiner
who writes:
[M]athematicians like Euler and Laplace had a deep in-
sight into the basic properties of the concepts of the
calculus, and were able to choose fruitful methods and
evade pitfalls [61, p. 188]
How can deep insight manage to “evade pitfalls” if the foundations are
regarded as inconsistent? Grabiner further claims that,
[s]ince an adequate response to Berkeley’s objections
would have involved recognizing that an equation in-
volving limits is a shorthand expression for a sequence of
inequalities—a subtle and difficult idea—no eighteenth
century analyst gave a fully adequate answer to Berkeley
[61, p. 189].
This is an astonishing claim, which amounts to reading back into his-
tory, developments that came much later. Such a claim amounts to
postulating the inevitability of a triumphant march, from Berkeley on-
ward, toward the radiant future of Weierstrassian epsilontics.57 The
claim of such inevitability in our opinion is an assumption that requires
further argument.
57Hourya Benis Sinaceur similarly mocks “l’hypothe`se d’un de´veloppement
monolithique, non diffe´rencie´, continue, univoque de l’analyse au XIXe siecle. Le
filon, perdu avec Bolzano, est heureusement retrouve´ par Cauchy, qui le rede´couvre,
l’e´largit, l’exploite plus amplement, le transmet a` Weierstrass, etc.” [123, p. 103],
and names Boyer [20, p. 271] as one of the culprits in perpetuating such a myth.
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Berkeley was, after all, attacking the coherence of infinitesimals .58
He was not attacking the coherence of some kind of incipient form of
Weierstrassian epsilontics and its inequalities. Isn’t there a simpler
answer to Berkeley’s query, in terms of a passage from a point of B-
continuum (see Appendix A), to the infinitely close point of the A-
continuum, namely passing from a variable quantity to its limiting
constant quantity?
A related attitude on the part of Felscher is discussed in Section 2.3.
Like Felscher, Grabiner [61, p. 190] suppresses Cauchy’s reference
to an infinitesimal increment of the independent variable when citing
Cauchy’s first definition (see Table 1 in Section 2.3 above), thereby
managing to avoid discussing Cauchy’s infinitesimals altogether. We
encounter the oft-repeated claim about “the same confusion between
uniform and point-wise convergence”59 [61, p. 191]. Her discussion of
Cauchy’s rigor does not mention that what rigor meant to Cauchy was
the replacement of the principle of the generality of algebra, by geome-
try, including infinitesimals. Grabiner correctly points out [61, p. 193]
that “Mathematicians are used to taking the rigorous foundations for
calculus for granted.” She concludes: “What I have tried to do as a his-
torian is to reveal what went into making up that great achievement.”
What we have tried to do is to introduce a necessary correction to
a post-Weierstrassian reading of Cauchy, influenced by an automated
infinitesimal-to-limits translation originating no later than Boyer [19,
p. 277], see [75] for additional details.
3.8. Devlin: Will the real Cauchy–Weierstrass please stand
up? The following exchange between the second-named author and
Keith Devlin, co-founder and Executive Director of Stanford Univer-
sity’s H-STAR institute, took place in may 2011. The exchange was
occasioned by Devlin’s article “Will the real continuous function please
stand up?”60 The article refers to an alleged “Cauchy–Weierstrass def-
inition of continuity”.
MK: I read with interest your online article on “continuous function
please stand up”. I am not sure which Cauchy–Weierstrass definition
you are referring to. What exactly was Cauchy’s definition of continu-
ity? I think I know what Weierstrass’s was.
58Berkeley’s criticism is dissected into its metaphysical and logical components
by D. Sherry [121].
59See Subsection 2.4 for a detailed discussion of the controversy over the “sum
theorem”.
60The article is online at http://www.maa.org/devlin/devlin 11
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KD: See61 http://www.maa.org/pubs/Calc articles/ma002.pdf
MK: But Grabiner does not say that Cauchy gave an epsilontic defini-
tion of continuity. I wonder if there is a reason for that. Do you know
what Cauchy’s definition of continuity was?
KD: Actually, she does say that: “Delta-epsilon proofs are first found
in the works of Augustin-Louis Cauchy (1789-1867). This is not always
recognized, since Cauchy gave a purely verbal definition of limit, which
at first glance does not resemble modern definitions.” In the UK when
I was a student, the standard term to refer to the usual ǫ-δ definition
was “the Cauchy–Weierstrass definition”, and by my read of Grabiner
that description seems appropriate.
MK: But my question concerned the definition of continuity . In the
UK, did they refer to a Cauchy–Weierstrass definition of continuity?
KD: It’s the same. f(x) is continuous at a if and only if f(a) is defined
and limx→a f(x) = f(a).
MK: Keith, this is your definition of continuity. It is not Cauchy’s
definition of continuity, for several reasons: (1) Cauchy did not at any
time work with “continuity at a point”, it is always continuity “between
two limits”, i.e. on an interval. (2) Cauchy’s definition is invariably
an infinitesimal one: “an infinitesimal x-increment always produces
an infinitesimal y-increment”. (3) Elsewhere, Cauchy is working for
the most part with a kinetic definition of limit, akin to that found in
Newton.62 Thus, the primary notion is that of a variable quantity.
Both infinitesimals and limits are defined in terms of variable quantity.
Could the notion of a “Cauchy–Weierstrass definition of continuity”
be an ahistorical blunder, regardless of whether it was adopted by the
mathematicians at a UK college?
KD: That was actually the way continuity was taught in the UK. To
my mind, once you have the basic epsilon-delta idea, which is a clever
static capture of the dynamic concept, everything just drops out. It
comes down to that one idea. And according to that Grabiner article,
that was due to Cauchy and then Weierstrass. Of course, once we had
that definition, our entire conception changed, and it may be that it is
only from a modern perspective that we can clearly see that there is
really just one fundamental notion there. That happens all the time,
of course. Our present day conception of Newton’s differential calculus
61The link provided is a link to an electronic version of Grabiner’s article [61].
62See footnote 15.
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is not the one Newton had.63 Sounds like you are trying to get at how
the people at the time conceived things.
MK: What you seem to be saying is that, even though Cauchy himself
said nothing of the sort regarding continuity, from a certain “modern
perspective” is it proper to interpret Cauchy in a certain way, now
that in retrospect we know that the epsilontic idea is the “fundamen-
tal notion”. This is precisely the ideology that I seek to refute. Felix
Klein pointed out in 1908 (in the original edition of his “Elementary
mathematics from an advanced viewpoint”) that there are really two
parallel strands to the development of analysis, the epsilontic one and
the infinitesimal one. Emile Borel in 1902 developed further du Bois-
Reymond’s theory of infinitesimal-enriched continua in terms of growth
rates of functions, and specifically refers to Cauchy’s work in this di-
rection from 1829 as inspiration. Note that Klein and Borel said this
well before Robinson. Viewed as the “father” of the infinitesimal ap-
proach ultimately vindicated by Robinson, Cauchy needn’t suffer a
forced explanation as a proto-Weierstrassian. Rather, his approach to
infinitesimals was further developed by Stolz, du Bois-Reymond, Borel,
Levi-Civita, and others around the turn of the century. When Skolem
developed first non-standard models of arithmetic in 1934, he was in-
spired partly by du Bois-Reymond’s work, according to Robinson. In
1948, Hewitt first developed hyperreal fields using ultraproducts. In
1955,  Los´ proved his theorem for ultraproducts, which implies the
transfer principle, which is the mathematical implementation of Leib-
niz’s heuristic “law of continuity”: whatever succeeds for the finite,
should also succeed for the infinite. Isn’t this lineage of infinitesimal
calculus more plausible than an alleged “Cauchy–Weierstrass definition
of continuity”?
KD: Ah, I assume you are a historian of mathematics. For sure my
perspective is very much that of mathematicians, who if they have
any interest in history (and I do) it is precisely from the perspective
you describe, tracing back the origins of the now accepted concepts in
terms that we now use. For instance, we interpret Newton’s work on
calculus as applied to continuous functions of a real variable, when that
is not at all what Newton was doing. (Actually, I don’t think we can
really understand what he was doing, since we are rooted in a modern
perspective.) Good luck with your investigations.64
63Pourciau refutes this view; see footnote 15.
64Devlin’s article acknowledges that it is based on Nu´n˜ez et al [108], who similarly
employ the term “Cauchy–Weierstrass definition of continuity”.
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To put the above exchange in perspective, it may be useful to recall
Grattan-Guinness’s articulation of a historical reconstruction project
in the name of H. Freudenthal [52], in the following terms:
it is mere feedback-style ahistory to read Cauchy (and
contemporaries such as Bernard Bolzano) as if they had
read Weierstrass already. On the contrary, their own
pre-Weierstrassian muddles65 need historical reconstruc-
tion [64, p. 176].
3.9. Grattan-Guinness on beautiful mathematics. On the sub-
ject of Robinson’s theory, Grattan-Guinness comments as follows:
I made no mention of non-standard analysis in my book,
for it was obvious to me that this very beautiful piece
of mathematics had nothing to tell us historically [62,
p. 247].
When Grattan-Guinness announced that Robinson’s construction of a
non-Archimedean extension of the reals “bears no resemblance to past
arguments in favor of infinitesimals” [62, p. 247], he was only telling
part of the story. True, the construction favored by Robinson exploited
powerful compactness theorems66 originating with Malcev [100] and
eschewed the sequential approach. On the other hand, the ultrapower
construction of the hyperreals, pioneered by E. Hewitt [69] in 1948
and popularized by Luxemburg [98] in 1962, is firmly rooted in the
sequential approach, and hence connects well with the kinetic vision of
Cauchy, shared by L. Carnot.67
4. Timeline of modern infinitesimals from Cauchy onward
The historical sequence of events, as far as continuity is concerned,
was as follows:68
(1) first came Cauchy’s infinitesimal definition, namely “infinitesi-
mal x-increment always produces an infinitesimal y-increment”;
(2) then came the Dirichlet/Weierstrass-style nominalistic recon-
struction of the original definition in terms of real inequalities,
dispensing with infinitesimals;
65Grattan-Guinness’s term “muddle” refers to an irreducible ambiguity of his-
torical mathematics such as Cauchy’s sum theorem of 1821.
66Robinson uses instead the term “finiteness principle of lower predicate calculus”
[112, p. 48] for what is known today as the compactness theorem.
67Some details on the ultrapower construction appear in Appendix A.
68We leave out Bolzano’s contribution which, while prior to Cauchy’s, did not
exert any influence until the 1860s.
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(3) Cauchy’s work influenced investigations in infinitesimal-enriched
continua by du Bois-Reymond, E. Borel, and others at the turn
of the century, see Table 2 (a more detailed account appears
below).
The historical priority of the infinitesimal definition is clear; what
is open to debate is the role of the modern definition in interpret-
ing the historical definition. The common element here is the null
sequence, a basis both for Cauchy infinitesimals, and, via intermedi-
ate developments in growth rates of functions as explained below, for
ultrapower-based infinitesimals.69
4.1. From Cauchy to du Bois-Reymond. Cauchy’s theory of arbi-
trary orders of magnitude for his infinitesimals was a harbinger, not of
Weierstrassian epsilontics, but of later theories of infinitesimal-enriched
continua as developed by Stolz [126], du Bois-Reymond [37], and others.
Emile Borel’s appreciation of the essential continuity between Cauchy’s
theory and that of his late 19th century heirs was already discussed in
Subsection 2.3.70 Robinson [112, p. 277-278] traces the evolution of
the infinitesimal ideal from Cauchy to du Bois-Reymond and Stolz, to
Skolem.71
4.2. From du Bois-Reymond to Robinson. Du Bois-Reymond’s
investigations were in turn pursued further by such mathematicians as
Emile Borel. In 1902, Borel [16, p. 35-36] cites Cauchy’s definition of
such “order of infinitesimal”72 as inspiration for du Bois-Reymond’s
theory. Hardy [67] provided a firm foundation for du Bois-Reymond’s
orders of infinity in 1910. Artin and Schreier [6] developed the theory
of real closed fields in 1926. Skolem [124] constructed the first non-
standard models of arithmetic in 1934. Hewitt’s hyperreals of 1948
and  Los´’s theorem of 1955 have already been discussed. In the 1960s,
Robinson proposed an infinitesimal theory [112] as an alternative to
Weierstrassian epsilontic analysis. The evolution of infinitesimal from
Cauchy to Robinson is summarized in Table 2.
69Modulo suitable foundational material, one can ensure that every hyperreal
infinitesimal is represented by a null sequence; an appropriate ultrafilter (called a
P-point) will exist if one assumes the continuum hypothesis, or even the weaker
Martin’s axiom (see Cutland et al [32] for details).
70See the main text following footnote 8.
71 See the main text around footnote 9.
72This definition appears in Oeuvres de Cauchy, se´rie 2, tome 4, p. 181, corre-
sponding to Cauchy’s Lec¸ons sur le calcul diffe´rentiel from 1829, appearing in a
section entitled “Pre´liminaires”; see G. Fisher [48, p. 144].
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years author contribution
1821 Cauchy Infinitesimal definition of continuity
1827 Cauchy Infinitesimal delta function
1829 Cauchy Defined “order of infinitesimal” in
terms of rates of growth of functions
1852 Bjo¨rling Dealt with convergence at points “in-
definitely close” to the limit
1853 Cauchy Clarified hypothesis of “sum theorem”
by requiring convergence at infinitesi-
mal points
1870-
1900
Stolz, du Bois-
Reymond, and
others
Infinitesimal-enriched number systems
defined in terms of rates of growth of
functions
1902 Emile Borel Elaboration of du Bois-Reymond’s
system
1910 G. H. Hardy Provided a firm foundation for du
Bois-Reymond’s orders of infinity
1926 Artin–Schreier Theory of real closed fields
1930 Tarski Existence of ultrafilters
1934 Skolem Nonstandard model of arithmetic
1948 Edwin Hewitt Ultrapower construction of hyperreals
1955  Los´ Proved  Los´’s theorem forshadowing
the transfer principle
1961,
1966
Abraham Robinson Non-Standard Analysis
1977 Edward Nelson Internal Set Theory
Table 2. Timeline of modern infinitesimals from Cauchy
to Nelson.
Edward Nelson [105] in 1977 proposed an axiomatic theory parallel to
Robinson’s theory, see Subsection 4.3. P. Ehrlich recently constructed
an isomorphism of maximal hyperreal and surreal fields, resulting in a
“unification of all numbers great and small” [40].
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4.3. Nelson. Edward Nelson [105] in 1977 proposed an axiomatic the-
ory parallel to Robinson’s theory. Nelson’s axiomatisation, called Inter-
nal Set Theory (IST), takes the form of an enrichment of the Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory (ZFC) [49]. IST amounts to a more stratified ax-
iomatisation for set theory, more congenial to infinitesimals.
In Nelson’s system, the usual construction of R, when interpreted
with respect to the foundational background provided by IST, produces
a number system already possessing entities behaving as infinitesimals.
In more detail, Nelson’s approach is a re-thinking of the foundational
material with a view to allowing a more stratified (hierarchical) number
line. Thus, the canonical set theory, namely ZFC, is modified by the
introduction of a unary predicate “standard”. Then what is known as
the usual construction of the “real” line produces a line that bears a
striking resemblance to the Hewitt- Los´-Robinson hyperreals.
To illustrate the power of Nelson’s approach, we quote Alain Robert
who starts his book on IST [111] with a homage to Leonard Euler:
Here is how [Euler] deduces the expansion of the cosine func-
tion [. . . ] He starts from the de Moivre formula
cosnz =
1
2
[(cos z + i sin z)n + (cos z − i sin z)n]
= cosn z −
n(n− 1)
1 · 2
cosn−2 z sin2 z
+
n(n− 1)(n − 2)(n − 3)
1 · 2 · 3 · 4
cosn−4 z sin4 z + · · ·
and writes [. . . ]
sit arcus z infinite parvus; erit cos ·z = 1, sin ·z =
z; sit autem n numerus infinite magnus, ut sit
arcus nz finitae magnitudinis, puta nz = v
cos ·v = 1−
v2
2!
+
v4
4!
—etc.
In the context of internal set theory, this argument becomes fully rig-
orous.
5. Conclusion
As we have seen, Cauchy experimented with a range of founda-
tional approaches, including infinitesimal methodologies. He antici-
pated a number of mathematical developments that occurred decades
later. One such development was the study of the asymptotic behav-
ior and rates of growth of functions, culminating in the construction
of infinitesimal-enriched continua by du Bois-Reymond, Emile Borel,
G. H. Hardy, and others. Another development anticipated by Cauchy
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was the Dirac delta function, of which Cauchy gave an infinitesimal
definition. Similarly, Bjo¨rling and Cauchy both articulated single-
variable definitions of stronger forms of continuity and convergence
(today called uniform), in the context of infinitesimal-enriched con-
tinua. One avenue for further exploration is Cauchy’s infinitesimal
approach to the degrees of contact among curves.73 Such visionary
anticipations in Cauchy are studiously obfuscated by scholars sporting
protective blinders, conditioned by a conceptual framework stemming
from a nominalistic reconstruction of analysis set in motion by the
“great triumvirate” of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass. Accord-
ing to the rules of such feedback-style ahistory, to borrow Grattan-
Guinness’s term,74 Cauchy’s infinitesimals are subjected to an auto-
mated translation to limits, the latter being promoted to first fiddle,
Cauchy’s explicit statements to the contrary notwithstanding (see Sub-
section 3.1). Yet, many historians have refused to toe the triumvirate
line. Cauchy’s anticipations are highlighted in insightful studies by
Freudenthal [51], Robinson [112], Hourya Benis Sinaceur [123], Lakatos
[89], Cleave [30], Cutland et al [32], Medvedev [101], Laugwitz [91], Sad
et al [116], Br˚ating [22], and others.
It bears pointing out that the the calculus of Newton and Leibniz was
not the same as ours, since they did not have a continuum that lives up
to modern standards. Yet historians routinely attribute the invention
of the calculus to them, implicitly taking it for granted that the calculus
of Newton and Leibniz can be interpreted in terms of modern calculus,
and vice versa. Isn’t it time we applied such bi-interpretability to
Cauchy’s infinitesimals, as well?
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Appendix A. Rival continua
A Leibnizian definition of the derivative as the infinitesimal ratio
∆y
∆x
,
whose logical weakness was criticized by Berkeley, was modified by
A. Robinson by exploiting a map called the standard part , denoted “st”,
73Cauchy does not hesitate to characterize the center of curvature as the meeting
point of a pair of infinitely close normals [26, p. 91].
74See main text at footnote 65.
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st

B-continuum
A-continuum
Figure 1. Thick-to-thin: taking standard part (the
thickness of the top line is merely conventional)
from the finite part of a B-continuum (for “Bernoullian”), to the A-
continuum (for “Archimedean”), as illustrated in Figure 1.75
We will denote such a B-continuum by a new symbol IIR. We will
also denote its finite part, by
IIR<∞ = {x ∈ IIR : |x| <∞} ;
namely, the difference IIR \ IIR<∞ consists of the inverses of nonzero
infinitesimals. The map “st” sends each finite point x ∈ IIR, to the real
point st(x) ∈ R infinitely close to x:
IIR<∞
st

R
Robinson’s answer to Berkeley’s logical criticism (see D. Sherry [121])
is to define the derivative of y = f(x) as
f ′(x) = st
(
∆y
∆x
)
,
rather than the infinitesimal ratio ∆y/∆x itself, as in Leibniz. “How-
ever, this is a small price to pay for the removal of an inconsistency”
[112, p 266].
We illustrate the construction by means of an infinite-resolution mi-
croscope in Figure 2.
Note that both the term “hyper-real field”, and an ultrapower con-
struction thereof, are due to E. Hewitt in 1948, see [69, p. 74]. The
transfer principle allowing one to extend every first-order real state-
ment to the hyperreals, is due to J.  Los´ in 1955, see [96]. Thus, the
75In the context of the hyperreal extension of the real numbers, the map “st”
sends each finite point x to the real point st(x) ∈ R infinitely close to x. In other
words, the map “st” collapses the cluster of points infinitely close to a real number x,
back to x. A comparative study of continua from a predicative angle may be found
in Feferman [42].
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Figure 2. Zooming in on infinitesimal ǫ
Hewitt- Los´ framework allows one to work in a B-continuum satisfying
the transfer principle.
Hewitt’s construction of hyper-real fields has roots in functional anal-
ysis, including works by Gelfand and Kolmogorov [53]. In 1990, Hewitt
reminisced about his
“efforts to understand the ring of all real-valued continu-
ous [not necessarily bounded] functions on a completely
regular T0-space. I was guided in part by a casual re-
mark made by Gel’fand and Kolmogorov76 [. . . ] Along
the way I found a novel class of real-closed fields that
superficially resemble the real number field and have
since become the building blocks for nonstandard anal-
ysis. I had no luck in talking to Artin about these hy-
perreal fields, though he had done interesting work on
real-closed fields in the 1920s. (My published ‘proof’
that hyperreal fields are real-closed is false: John Is-
bell earned my gratitude by giving a correct proof some
years later.) [. . . ] My ultra-filters also struck no respon-
sive chords. Only Irving Kaplansky seemed to think my
ideas had merit. My first paper on the subject was pub-
lished only in 1948” [70]
(Hewitt goes on to detail the influence of his 1948 text). Here Hewitt
is referring to Isbell’s 1954 paper [71], proving that Hewitt’s hyper-real
fields are real closed. Note that a year later,  Los´ [96] proved the general
transfer principle for such fields, implying in particular the property of
being real closed.
76Here Hewitt cites Gelfand and Kolmogoroff [53].
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(
QN
/
Fu
)
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st
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≃
// R
Figure 3. An intermediate field QN
/
Fu is built directly
out of Q
To elaborate on the ultrapower construction of the hyperreals, let QN
denote the space of sequences of rational numbers. Let
(
QN
)
C
denote
the subspace consisting of Cauchy sequences. The reals are by defini-
tion the quotient field
R :=
(
QN
)
C
/
Fnull,
where the ideal Fnull contains all the null sequences. Meanwhile, an
infinitesimal-enriched field extension of Q may be obtained by forming
the quotient
QN
/
Fu,
see Figure 3. Here a sequence 〈un : n ∈ N〉 is in Fu if and only if the
set
{n ∈ N : un = 0}
is a member of a fixed ultrafilter.77 To give an example, the se-
quence
〈
(−1)n
n
〉
represents a nonzero infinitesimal, whose sign depends
on whether or not the set 2N is a member of the ultrafilter. To obtain
a full hyperreal field, we replace Q by R in the construction, and form
a similar quotient
IIR := RN
/
Fu.
A more detailed discussion of the ultrapower construction can be
found in M. Davis [35]. See also B laszczyk [14] for some philosophi-
cal implications. More advanced properties of the hyperreals such as
saturation were proved later, see Keisler [84] for a historical outline.
A helpful “semicolon” notation for presenting an extended decimal ex-
pansion of a hyperreal was described by A. H. Lightstone [95]. See also
77An ultrafilter on N can be thought of as a way of making a systematic choice,
between each pair of complementary infinite subsets of N, so as to prescribe which
one is “dominant” and which one is “negligible”. Such choices have to be made
in a coherent manner, e.g., if a subset A ⊂ N is negligible then any subset of A
is negligible, as well. The existence of ultrafilters was proved by Tarski [131], see
Keisler [85, Theorem 2.2]. See a related remark about P-points in footnote 69.
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heuristic concept mathematical implementation
adequality standard part function
law of continuity transfer principle
infinitesimal-enriched continuum hyperreal number line
Table 3. Modern mathematical implementation of 17th
century heuristic concepts.
P. Roquette [113] for infinitesimal reminiscences. A discussion of infin-
itesimal optics is in K. Stroyan [127], H. J. Keisler [83], D. Tall [128],
L. Magnani & R. Dossena [99, 36], and Bair & Henry [7].
Applications of the B-continuum range from aid in teaching calculus
[41, 73, 74, 129, 130] to the Bolzmann equation (see L. Arkeryd [4, 5]);
modeling of timed systems in computer science (see H. Rust [115]);
mathematical economics (see R. Anderson [3]); mathematical physics
(see Albeverio et al. [1]); etc.
An interesting elementary example of a B-continuum is the ring of
dual numbers, that is, numbers of the form a+ bδ, where δ2 = 0. It is
useful, for example, in the theory of linear algebraic groups and linear
Lie groups, and enable a quick and transparent computation of Lie
algebras of groups like SO3(R).
Recently, Giordano [55, 56, 57] introduced a systematic way of en-
riching the reals by nilpotent infinitesimals, referring to the resulting
structure as the ring of Fermat reals .
The transfer principle of the modern theory of infinitesimals is a
mathematical implementation of Leibniz’s heuristic law of continuity,
see Robinson [112, p. 266], and Laugwitz [92]. The standard part
function is a mathematical implementation of Fermat’s concept of ad-
equality, see Table 3.
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